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BIANNUAL SURVEY

succeed, the direct result sought to be accomplished by the statute
would, be thwarted. The result reached in the instant case is the
only logical one in light of what the statute seeks to insure. To
hold otherwise would compel a plaintiff who desires to effect service
pursuant to section 254 to continually survey a proposed defendant's
residence in order to determine whether or not he had returned
from his more than thirty-day absence.
CPLR 311 and BCL § 307.: Alternate methods of service.
In lieu of employing the provisions of Article 3 of the CPLR,
jurisdiction over foreign corporations may be based upon BCL § 307,
and service of process may be made as therein prescribed. Under
the CPLR, foreign corporations are subject to the jurisdiction of
New York for their business activities if they are "doing business"
here in the traditional sense, s or if they "transact any business"
in this state and are sued with respect to that business.59 In either
case personal service of process must normally be made upon an
officer or agent of the defendant pursuant to CPLR 311. In
comparison, BCL § 307, prior to September 1, 1965, subjected a
foreign corporation to New York's jurisdiction if it was "doing any
business" here and provided that service of process be made upon
the Secretary of State followed by service of process upon an officer
or agent of the defendant either personally or by mailing.
In Railex Corp. v. White Machine Co.,60 decided June 7, 1965,
the plaintiff attempted to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant
foreign corporation by service of process upon the Secretary of State
pursuant to BCL § 307. The court, however, held that no jurisdiction had been obtained because BCL § 307 was applicable only
when the defendant was "doing business" in New York in the
traditional sense. The court found it irrelevant that a basis for
jurisdiction probably existed under the long-arm statute, CPLR
302(a) (1) (transacting any business), since in such event service
should have been made personally upon an officer or an agent
of the defendant pursuant to CPLR 311.61
As of September 1, 1965, however, BCL § 307 has been
amended so as to effect in personam jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation in the New York courts in any case where jurisdiction
would also exist under Article 3 of the CPLR.
53 CPLR 301 allows New York courts to exercise such jurisdiction over
non-domiciliaries as could be exercised prior to the enactment of the
The traditional requirement for jurisdiction over foreign corporations
they be "doing business" in New York. For a clarification of
business," see Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208

439, 260 N.Y.S2d 625 (1965).
59 CPLR 302(a) (1).
60 243 F. Supp. 381 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
61 Id. at 384.
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Henceforth, whenever jurisdiction exists over a foreign corporation under the CPLR, jurisdiction also exists under BCL § 307,
and service of process may be made on the Secretary of State
followed by delivery of a notice and copy of the process to an
officer or agent of the defendant either personally or by mailing.
It should be noted that the sole significant value of BCL § 307 is
that it provides an alternate means of service upon foreign
corporations.
CPLR 325(c): Wrongful transfer to lower court does not affect
monetary jurisdictional limit of that court.
CPLR 325(c) provides that where it appears that the amount
of damages sustained are less than demanded, and a lower court
would have had jurisdiction but for the amount demanded, the
court in which the action is pending may remove it to the lower
court upon the written consent of the plaintiff and upon the
reduction of the amount demanded to the monetary jurisdictional
limit of the lower court. The consent of the defendant is also
required if the lower court would not have had jurisdiction over the
defendant if the action had been originally commenced there.
In Martin v. Farrell,62 the action had originally been brought
in the supreme court where the relief demanded was $25,000.
Subsequently it was transferred to the Essex County Court. There
was, however, neither plaintiff's written consent for the transfer,
nor a reduction in his demand for relief to $6,000, which was then
63
the monetary jurisdictional limitation of the Essex County Court.
Also lacking was defendant's written consent to the transfer which
was required under CPLR 325(c), since the defendant, a nondomiciliary of Essex County, would not have been subject to the
jurisdiction of the court if the action had been initially brought
there. Neither party, however, made any objection to the transfer
either before or during trial. At the end of the trial, the jury
rendered a verdict for $10,000. Following the verdict the defendant
sought to have it reduced to $6,000. The court, in considering
this motion, held that although the transfer was improper under
CPLR 325(c), both 'the plaintiff and defendant had waived any
right to object to the jurisdiction of the court by impliedly consenting to the transfer and proceeding with the trial.
6247 Misc. 2d 126, 261 N.Y.S.2d 820 (County Ct Essex County 1965).
63JUDicrARY RuLF- § 190(3) states that the monetary jurisdictional limit
of county courts outside New York City is $6,000. This is modified, however,
by subdivision 5 of the same section which enumerates forty-four counties
which are exceptions to subdivision 3 and have a jurisdictional monetary
limitation of $10,000. It should be noted that as of September 1, 1965,
Essex has been added to the latter list of counties and therefore it now
may validly render a judgment up to the limit of $10,000.

